Built-in Intelligence

Privileged access,
without the bastion.

Your administrators get a browser tab instead of a VPN, a jump host and a copy of the root key. You get a live picture of who is on which server right now, a passkey on every session, and a replay of what happened.

ManageLM Session Portal showing who is connected to which server
0
Ports, VPNs or bastions
1
Passkey per session
4
Session types, one map
10 min
Idle lock by default
On this page

Why privileged access is hard

Privileged access is the part of an infrastructure nobody enjoys owning. The keys get copied. The bastion is itself a server that has to be patched, watched and paid for. The VPN is a permanent opening with a password in front of it. And the honest answer to "who is on the production database server right now" is usually a guess followed by a grep.

ManageLM takes the opposite route. The agent already installed on each server holds an outbound connection to the portal, so an administrator reaches a machine through the platform rather than through the network. Every session is therefore something the platform opened: it knows who asked, it checked they were allowed, it can record it, and it can end it.

Nothing new to deploy. Same agent, same outbound WebSocket. There is no bastion to build, no concentrator to license, no inbound port to open, and no extra thing in the path that can be down on the morning you need it most.

Two pages carry the whole idea. The Console Portal is what your operators use. The Session Portal is what you watch.

The Console Portal

A page of its own at /consoles: every server you are allowed to open, and nothing else. It is built to be bookmarked and left in a tab. Open the bookmark, sign in if your session has expired, pick a host. Unlike a link to one particular shell it keeps working when a server is rebuilt, and when today's problem is on a different machine.

Terminal

A real root shell in the browser, with an assistant that reads the screen and suggests the next command. Nothing runs until somebody presses Enter.

File browser

Browse, edit, upload and download without opening SFTP to the world. Every file that moves is written to the audit trail.

Desktop

A Windows desktop in the browser, signed in with a throwaway administrator created for that session and removed when it ends. No RDP exposed anywhere.

Access is granted per server, not per network

The list shows what you may open, and it is the same test the console itself applies: the Console permission, plus your assignment to that server. It is a shortcut to access you already have, never a way to acquire some. Revoke the permission and any window that person already had open closes within a minute.

Compare that with a network-level answer. A VPN or a jump host grants a segment; the moment somebody is on it, what they can reach is a routing question rather than a policy one. Here the unit is the server, and the grant is checked again every time a session opens.

A passkey at the start of every session

Signing in to the portal is not enough to open a root shell. A passkey is confirmed at the moment the session opens, every time, on terminals, file browsers and desktops alike. That is what stops a borrowed laptop or a stolen browser session from becoming access to production, and there is no way to skip it: an account with no passkey enrolled cannot open a console at all.

Sessions then lock themselves when they go idle, after a number you set from five minutes to an hour. A terminal covers its screen and stops accepting input while your work keeps running behind it. A desktop closes and can be resumed exactly where it was. Walking away from a machine stops being the same thing as leaving the door open.

The Session Portal

Who is connected to your servers, and how. A page of its own at /sessions, meant to be left open on a second screen. People are drawn down one side, servers down the other, and a line joins them wherever somebody is connected. It is the question every access review asks after the fact, answered while it is still happening.

It draws sessions, not your fleet. A server nobody is on does not appear at all, so four people working across five hundred servers draw four lines. The picture stays the size of what is happening rather than the size of what you own, which is what makes it readable at a glance from across a room.

Named, not guessed

A filled avatar is somebody ManageLM can name, with their role. A hollow one is a plain account on the server, which is all a direct login tells anyone.

Live, to the second

Windows the portal opened appear and vanish within seconds. Logins made directly on a server arrive on the next agent check-in, about half a minute.

Unmanaged, flagged

A login that did not come through a key ManageLM manages is marked on the card and counted in the header, because that is the session nobody is recording.

Each person's card carries a badge per kind of connection with a count: terminals, file browsers, desktops and host logins. Hover a card or a line to see every session behind it, including what kind it is, how long it has been open, where it came from and when it started. Click to pin the panel open while you read it.

Two kinds of connection appear here that ManageLM did not open: somebody signed in over SSH, and on Windows somebody connected by RDP or at the console. A Windows session whose client has disconnected but is still signed in is shown as idle, a distinction the usual Linux tooling cannot make.

Owners and admins only. The Session Portal answers "who is on my servers, and which of those sessions is nobody watching", which is a question for the people accountable for the fleet. Everyone else sees their own open windows on the Console Portal instead.

Access outside ManageLM

Most privileged access products tell you about the sessions they opened. The interesting ones are the others: the key an engineer added by hand two years ago, the password login on a machine that predates your policy, the service credential in a script nobody has read since. Those sessions are not recorded, the idle lock cannot reach them, and until now they were invisible.

ManageLM shows them anyway. A login that did not arrive through a key it manages is marked with a warning on the person's card and counted in the header of the page, so "how much of my privileged access is outside my control" becomes a number on a screen rather than a project. It is also the honest measure of how far a key migration has actually got.

You can be emailed when one appears. Unmanaged Access is off by default, on purpose: until every key on a fleet has been moved into ManageLM this fires for every ordinary login, and a notification that is noise on day one is one nobody reads on day ninety. Switch it on the day unmanaged access becomes a finding on your fleet rather than a description of it.

Recorded and replayable

Recording is decided per server, or set on a group to cover every server in it. A group can only switch it on, which is what makes it usable as a policy rather than a preference. Servers being recorded carry a badge in the list and the operator sees one in the window, so nobody is recorded without knowing.

For the portal's own sessions nothing is installed on the server to make this work: the portal already relays every byte, so it records what it is already carrying. Direct SSH logins are recorded by the agent on the host itself, since those never pass through ManageLM at all.

  1. Your bucket, your keys
    Recordings are encrypted before they leave your infrastructure and written to your own S3 storage. The bucket holds nothing readable and ManageLM keeps no copy.

  2. Replay in place
    Play, pause, scrub and change speed. A timeline beside the player lists the moments worth jumping to: when the screen locked, what the assistant proposed and whether it ran, and every file that moved.

  3. Hand it to an auditor
    Download a terminal session as an asciinema cast that plays on any machine and needs nothing from us. A desktop session downloads as a Guacamole stream that converts to an ordinary video.

  4. Retention you set
    Recordings are deleted from your bucket automatically after a period you choose, capped by your audit log retention so a recording never outlives the entry saying who opened it.

What recording is, and is not. It captures what the session displayed, never what was typed, so a password at a prompt is not in the file. On direct SSH it covers only keys ManageLM syncs and only sessions with a terminal, and only on Linux. And it is an audit trail for people acting in good faith, not a containment boundary: somebody with root on a server can stop the recorder. If you need sessions that cannot go unrecorded, make the portal console the only way in.

What you stop running

The business case is mostly subtraction. Every row below is a component you no longer buy, patch, monitor, renew or explain to an auditor:

The usual stackManageLM
Reaching a serverVPN, then a jump hostA browser tab
Inbound firewallOpen to the bastionNothing open
Standing accessKeys copied onto hostsChecked per session
Second factorOnce, at the VPNEvery session
Who is connected nowLog in and lookOn screen, live
Session recordingA separate productSame switch
Onboarding a serverBastion and firewall changesInstall the agent

It works where your servers are. Because access travels over the agent's own outbound connection, a machine behind NAT in a branch office, in a cloud you do not control, or on a network your VPN never reached is opened the same way as the rack next door. There is no such thing as a server that is too far away to administer.

Open a root shell in your browser today.

Install the agent, approve it, confirm a passkey. There is no bastion to build first.